Note: having read the actual full text of this agreement (thanks Robert!!) I have to say that it is even worse than what I feared. I simply do not have the time to lay out my arguments before tomorrow evening. That is also when I will reply to the numerous and interesting comments disagreeing with my view. BTW – I sincerely thank you all for your comments, it is precisely this type of disagreement which can generate the most interesting discussions!
I will be back hopefully tomorrow evening!
Many thanks and kind regards,
The Saker
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Full text of the deal between the US and Russia to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons by mid-2014.
Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Taking into account the decision of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the commitment of the Syrian authorities to provisionally apply the Convention prior to its entry into force, the United States and the Russian Federation express their joint determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program (CW) in the soonest and safest manner.
For this purpose, the United States and the Russian Federation have committed to prepare and submit in the next few days to the Executive Council of the OPCW a draft decision setting down special procedures for expeditious destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof. The principles on which this decision should be based, in the view of both sides, are set forth in Annex A. The United States and the Russian Federation believe that these extraordinary procedures are necessitated by the prior use of these weapons in Syria and the volatility of the Syrian civil war.
The United States and the Russian Federation commit to work together towards prompt adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that reinforces the decision of the OPCW Executive Council. This resolution will also contain steps to ensure its verification and effective implementation and will request that the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the OPCW, submit recommendations to the UN Security Council on an expedited basis regarding the UN’s role in eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons program.
The United States and the Russian Federation concur that this UN Security Council resolution should provide for review on a regular basis the implementation in Syria of the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW, and in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The proposed joint US-Russian OPCW draft decision supports the application of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of any cases of non-compliance to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.
In furtherance of the objective to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program, the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a shared assessment of the amount and type of chemical weapons involved, and are committed to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in Syria. The United States and the Russian Federation expect Syria to submit, within a week, a comprehensive listing, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.
We further determined that the most effective control of these weapons may be achieved by removal of the largest amounts of weapons feasible, under OPCW supervision, and their destruction outside of Syria, if possible. We set ambitious goals for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW related materials and equipment with the objective of completing such removal and destruction in the first half of 2014. In addition to chemical weapons, stocks of chemical weapons agents, their precursors, specialized CW equipment, and CW munitions themselves, the elimination process must include the facilities for the development and production of these weapons. The views of both sides in this regard are set forth in Annex B.
The United States and the Russian Federation have further decided that to achieve accountability for their chemical weapons, the Syrians must provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria. The extraordinary procedures to be proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation for adoption by the OPCW Executive Council and reinforced by a UN Security Council resolution, as described above, should include a mechanism to ensure this right.
Under this framework, personnel under both the OPCW and UN mandate should be dispatched as rapidly as possible to support control, removal, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities.
The United States and the Russian Federation believe that the work of the OPCW and the UN will benefit from participation of the experts of the P5 countries.
The United States and the Russian Federation strongly reiterate their position on Syria as reflected in the Final Communique of the G-8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013, especially as regards chemical weapons.
The two sides intend to work closely together, and with the OPCW, the UN, all Syrian parties, and with other interested member states with relevant capabilities to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.
The United States and the Russian Federation note that there are details in furtherance of the execution of this framework that need to be addressed on an expedited basis in the coming days and commit to complete these details, as soon as practicable, understanding that time is of the essence given the crisis in Syria.
Annex A
Principles for Decision Document by OPCW Executive Council
1. The decision should be based on para 8. Art. IV and para. 10 of Art V of the CWC.
2. The decision should address the extraordinary character of the situation with the Syrian chemical weapons.
3. The decision should take into account the deposit by Syria of the instrument of accession to the CWC.
4. The decision should provide for the easy accessibility for States Parties of the information submitted by Syria.
5. The decision should specify which initial information Syria shall submit to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in accordance with a tightly fixed schedule and also specifies an early date for submission of the formal CWC declaration.
6. The decision should oblige Syria to cooperate fully on all aspects of its implementation.
7. The decision should address a schedule for the rapid destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities. This schedule should take into account the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections of declared sites by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.
The shortest possible final deadline, as well as intermediate deadlines, for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities should be included into the schedule.
8. The decision should provide stringent special verification measures, beginning within a few days, including a mechanism to ensure the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites.
9. The decision should address the issue of duties of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this situation and its need for supplementary resources to implement the decision, particularly technical and personnel resources, and call upon states with relevant capacities to contribute to this end.
10. The decision should refer to the provisions of the CWC obliging the Executive Council, in cases of non-compliance with the Convention, to bring the issues directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.
Annex B
Joint Framework on Destruction of Syrian CW
The Russian Federation and the United States of America agree on the need to achieve rapid elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, thus reducing the threat posed to the people of Syria. They are each prepared to devote high-level attention and resources to support the monitoring and destruction mission of the OPCW, both directly and in cooperation with the United Nations and other States concerned. They agree to set an ambitious goal of eliminating the threat in a rapid and effective manner.
Both parties agree that a clear picture of the state of Syrian chemical weapons could help advance a cooperative development of destruction options, including possible removal of chemical weapons outside of the Syrian territory. We agree on the importance of rapid destruction of the following categories:
1. Production equipment
2. Mixing and filling equipment
3. Filled and unfilled weapons and delivery systems
4. Chemical agents (unweaponized) and precursor chemicals. For these materials, they will pursue a hybrid approach, i.e., a combination of removal from Syria and destruction within Syria, depending upon site-specific conditions. They will also consider the possibility of consolidation and destruction in the coastal area of Syria.
5. Material and equipment related to the research and development of chemical weapons
The two parties agree to utilize the “universal matrix”, developed in the course of consultations by our two National Security Councils, as the basis for an actionable plan.
They agree that the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria should be considered an urgent matter to be implemented within the shortest possible time period.
The parties agree to set the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. The Russian Federation and the United States will work together closely, including with the OPCW, the UN and Syrian parties to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, noting the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard
Saker Message:
So how long before the Russians go to the UNSC asking for an approved attack on the insurgents? It will be touching to see Kerry argue against this.
(…) Kerry said any violations will result in “measures” from the UN security council, while Lavrov said the violations must be sent to the security council from the board of the chemical weapons convention before sanctions short of the use of force would be considered. (…)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/14/syris-crisis-us-russia-chemical-weapons-deal
(…) Lavrov also urged the re-examination of reports concerning the delivery of weapons, maybe even chemical agents to Syria.
“All this must be brought to the UN Security Council for investigation. Channels, if confirmed, should be identified and should be blocked immediately,” Lavrov added.
There have been various reports of different countries supplying Syrian rebels with arms, but recently the UK media revealed British companies sold sodium fluoride, a key ingredient in the manufacture of the nerve gas sarin, to Syrian firms between 2004 and 2010. Sarin, considered one of the world’s most dangerous chemical warfare agents, was allegedly used in the August 21 Ghouta attack.
Moreover, in the past two weeks the US has begun delivering conventional arms to militants fighting the Syrian government, after Washington’s decision to open the way for arms and munitions, according to Washington Post report. (…)
http://rt.com/news/lavrov-syria-agreement-chemical-868/
US-Russia agreement is even worse than I feared it could be. Some posters were too optimistic, unfortunately. How could Russia agree to this? It seems like sell-out of Syria, but we dont know whats happening behind closed doors. Such phrasing and open-ended interpretations means de-facto US getting their way with Syria.
“or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”
This is not a blunder or mistake, this wording specifically means that red-flags WILL happen and US with alies automatically gets an upper hand calling for Ch7 under this agreement against Syria.
“immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria.”
Iraq deja-vu. Inspectors (i.e. spies) will be able to spy on any military base or object, mark them for bombing or direct terrorists attacks from the ground, track army movements, check conventional stockpiles, etc. Having satellite surveillance was a big help for terrorists, but spies with unfettered access working from inside Syria’s military will be an IMMENSE boost for terrorists attacks and/or USrael bombing. US will know exactly where to direct hits to inflict the maximum damage to Syria’s army, regardless if they do it themselves or through proxy. If they’ll find a weak point, they’ll press on it as hard as they can.
“deviations from the plan, including attacks on UN inspectors, would be brought to the UN Security Council”
If Syria as much as tries to object of conventional bases inspections, thats an automatic “deviation” and call for Ch7, a la Iran and Parchin, just much worse.
Terrorists already attacked and shot at UN investigators, already kidnapped UN peacekeepers (twice), and now they didnt waste time declaring yesterday “we will not protect the inspectors or let them enter Syria.”
Guess who will be blamed when investigators will be shot at? Thats right, Syria will be brought to UNSC with yet another official charge of either committing this crime, or not providing enough security. Regardless what Syria does it will be blamed, this time on the highest UNSC level.
Bottom line: all Syria got was a very short breathing window, just a couple of months. After that it will be worse, much worse. I’m not sure what Russia was thinking, I dont believe it was sell-out (even though it looks like it), but at this time its unclear what concessions they got to agree to this abomination deal. I do hope these concessions arent entirely for Russia itself…
This deal made a living hell for Syria and its army. Argument “at least its better than bombing” doesnt fly, because if US didnt want to bomb, they wouldnt have, and if they want to, they will anyway, but this time with spies on the ground directing where to hit, for bombers and Al Qaeda alike.
Still disagree with you. Going to the UN after another false flag is going to be very risky for the anti-Syrian alliance. Russia is now promoting the “false flag” meme, and it was in Putin’s letter. The US would be stuck arguing that it wasn’t al-CIAduh or the Mossad. Who wants peace? Assad or al-CIAduh?
As for the spying, yes, that is a risk, but I still think many folks are missing the important issue: Russia is in the game. They have great technology, and lots of experience in dealing with the maneuvers of the US. Having a KGB man at the top is a great advantage.
I’m the guy who argued that Syria will now be dependent upon Russia, and you didn’t see that as being a good thing, and that Russia wouldn’t go to war to save Syria. First, I would argue that Israel is only around today because it’s protected, so it’s not so radical to think that little countries need a big brother. Second, this war would have been over in a negative way a long time ago if Russia hadn’t gone to the mat, and it would seem more logical for Russia to have a big war in the Middle East than to fight in a couple of years closer to home. If the US will ignore the UNSC on something this important, China and Russia have to assume the worst.
Meanwhile and of course far too late – A report on the Libyan intervention
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23387/lessons_from_libya.html
“BOTTOM LINES
• The Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong. Libya’s 2011 uprising was never peaceful, but instead was armed and violent from the start. Muammar al-Qaddafi did not target civilians or resort to indiscriminate force. Although inspired by humanitarian impulse, NATO’s intervention did not aim mainly to protect civilians, but rather to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans.
• The Intervention Backfired. NATO’s action magnified the conflict’s duration about sixfold and its death toll at least sevenfold, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors. If Libya was a “model intervention,” then it was a model of failure.
• Three Lessons. First, beware rebel propaganda that seeks intervention by falsely crying genocide. Second, avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels and thus endanger civilians, unless the state is already targeting noncombatants. Third, resist the tendency of humanitarian intervention to morph into regime change, which amplifies the risk to civilians.”
The “the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria” reminds me of what Scott Ritter said about the weapons inspection team in Iraq: The US was using the weapons inspection process to harrass and humiliate Saddam Hussein, ie: sending weapons inspectors anywhere the US felt like, including into his bedroom and digging up the floor in the bathroom of his homes. Also the US was using this “right” to collect intelligence information to mount decapitation airstrikes against Hussein. None of those decapitation strikes succeeded but the US invoked UNSCOM’s right to do an enormous amount of snooping that was completely irrelevant to the task of verifiying the Saddam has divested himself of all of his chemical weapons.
Also, I had heard that the main funtion served by these weapons was to have some option for a retaliatory counter-strike in case Israel used WMD against Syria. Being disarmed of this stockpile raises the small risk of a massive, genocidal war being waged by Israel.
I imagine this will also provide a useful template for the West to try to effect a similar destabilization and disarmament of PAkistan, under the pretext that its weapons might forseeably end up in jihadi hands.
During Kerry’s effort to convince the Europeans to intervene in Syria he said that this moment compare to Munich in September 1938, Kerry meant Munich could not be repeated and that the world had to act this time in the face of a dictator. Of course his comparison was just a little off the mark, Hitler had claims to the Südeten Lands, German minorities in Czechoslovakia and wanted a political solution because other issues were on the offing, namely the fate of city of Danzig and the related crisis with Poland. Chamberlain despite French concerns conceded and announced his famous “peace in out time” One year later WW2 begun with the German invasion of Poland.
Now, September 2013, the US wants military action in Syria and Russia, the only power with sufficient might to make the US thinks twice before acting opposes the move by depriving the US of the blessing of the UNO, denouncing any action outside the UN a violation of international law. Then come the two missiles intercepted by Russia in the Mediterranean sea, perhaps one shot down forcing the Kerry-Lavrov agreement.
Nearly forgotten on the action is Iran. While Kerry rushes to brief Israel on the deal, Putin announces a visit to Teheran, disclosing Russia’s resuming delivery of the S-300 system and the building of a new nuclear plant.
Chamberlain wanted time knowing the worst was to come, so does Putin, Syria being the road to Iran. That is the meaning of this agreement: buying time.
While Kerry was talking to Lavrov the Shangai Iniative convened under Putin.
Russia will perhaps no fight for Syria but it might very well do for Iran. Historical and economical reasons are involved. For the preservation of peace the Syrian conflict has to end, very telling little on that regard is reflected at the moment.