First, let me point you to some other analyses about the SOFA: Juan Cole,Robert Dreyfuss, Stratfor and Pepe Escobar.
Reading through these analyses I amazed that nobody seems to be very concerned about the fact that the final text has still not been leaked. It will, probably before the end of the week, but for the time being everybody is commenting mostly on the basis of what can only be called hearsay. Still, whatever the fine print of the SOFA is, a number of elements in it appear to be quasi-certain. According to the SOFA,
- The USA will have to give up the ideas of permanent bases
- The USA will not be able to launch military operations from Iraq on other countries
- The USA will be out of Iraq by 2011
There is more stuff than that, but the rest is mostly “fluff” (for example, nobody seriously expects the USA to place any of its forces under Iraqi authority).
So who ‘won’ here? Did the Maliki government obtain major concessions from the USA?
Frankly, I am not impressed. Not one bit.
First, there defenders of the SOFA are trying to present as a huge victory that the US will not be able to station bases in Iraq. That is no victory at all. Consider this:
De jure, First, the UN mandate expires in December and after that the US would, theoretically need to get out anyway.
De facto, the US is bankrupt and regardless of its imperial hubris it does not have the means so sustain an occupation which costs the taxpayer anywhere from a billion a day to several trillions over time.
So what does this SOFA achieve on getting the USA out of Iraq? Nothing. Nothing for the Iraqis, that is.
For the Americans is gives them three years to withdraw in an organized and planned fashion. Is that in the interests of the Iraqi people? That is for them to decide, of course, but I for one thing would have preferred a panicked “run for our lives” similar to what happened when the Vietnamese booted out the Empire out of their country, with the last folks jumping into helicopters from the roof the US embassy. That kind of image is *priceless* in hammering into the minds of the (mostly militaristic) American people the basic truth that wars are dangerous, costly, and not so easily won. What does the SOFA do in this respect? It allow the USA to do what it loves to do: declare victory and leave. Why give them this present?
Score on this one: USA 1, Iraq 0
Now let’s look at the second “victory”: the guarantee that the US will not launch military operations from Iraq.
Let’s us just use basic common sense here. Let’s say that the Americans decide to bomb some construction site in Syria or an empty building in Khorramshar (the usual “terrorist bases” the Americans love to destroy). What will the Iraqis do in response? They will protest, no doubt. And what will the Americans answer to the Iraqi protests? “Sue me!”, of course.
The fact that the USA has no problems violating international law in all its aspects and that it would be naive in the extreme to expect it to abide by the terms of a SOFA signed with a puppet government whose survival depends on American protection in the first place.
Score card so far: USA 2, Iraq 0
Let’s look at the last “victory”. The USA will be out of Iraq by 2011. Last time I checked, Obama promised to be out in 16 months, so what the Maliki cabinet is giving him is *more* time to stay in Iraq, hardly something to be proud of.
Final score card: USA 3, Iraq 0.
I would also add the following: a SOFA is not an international treaty and the USA has absolutely no legal obligation to abide by its provisions. An international treaty has to be ratified by Congress after which, and only after which, it becomes the Law of the Land in the USA. Not so with a SOFA whose exact terms are often kept secret to begin with.
No matter how you look at it, the SOFA gives the Iraqis absolutely nothing while providing the USA with a desperately needed figleaf to hide is abject failure in Iraq and that begs the question of why al-Sistani and the Iranians are not overly opposing it like the Sadrists do.
I don’t know enough about al-Sistani to speculate about his motives. The little I know about him leaves me utterly unimpressed by his attitude. Sure, being “above the crowd” does look noble and majestic, but when your country is being raped, pillaged and destroyed and when more of your fellow Iraqis have been killed then in the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides this kind of lofty silence does not look so noble at all, at least to me.
What about the Iranians?
The idea is being floated out there about some kind of bargain being made between the Iranians and the new Obama administration and I have to say that this seems plausible to me. For many years the Iranians have tried to reach some deal with the USA and only the amazing stupidity of the Neocons prevented any kind of deal from being made. There is, however, another explanation which seems far more likely, at least to me.
Iran is not the unitary actor which the Western media likes to say it is. The fact is that the Iranian political system is extremely decentralized, with plenty of different centers of power and that the Iranian society in general, and the Iranian political scene in particular, is composed of many different factions with often radically opposed views and agendas. To make things worse, or better – depending on your outlook, there is an upcoming Presidential election in Iran, and considering the, shall we say, less than stellar performance of President Ahmadinejad, this election will be highly contested. As a result, politicians in Iran are walking a very fine line with the situation in Iraq. On one hand, to openly criticize the Maliki government might alienate some Shia factions in Iran (and Iraq), but on the other hand not criticising this SOFA, or the generally collaborationist attitude of the Maliki government, might alienate other Shia factions. One has to also consider the objective options Iran has.
Taking an openly “Sadrist” position is guaranteed to finally push Maliki and the rest of his cabinet in the arms of the American and leave the Iranians with only one potential ally in Iraq: al-Sadr himself. I don’t know what the assessment of al-Sadr is in Tehran, but I would most definitely not want to rely on this character for my policy towards Iraq. The fundamental reality for the Iranian is this:
While Iran has plenty of power and influence in Iraq, it does not have any reliable allies. In other words, there is no “Iraqi Hezbollah” or “Iraqi Hassan Nasrallah”. That is the crucial dilemma, the most painful headache for the Iranians and their stance towards Iraq.
The devil’s choice of “Maliki versus Sadr” leaves only one viable option for the Iranians: not to decide at all. It is far more advantageous for the Iranians to play one against the other since that maximizes Iran’s influence over the developments in Iraq and it allows them time to seek out and groom a much needed *trustworthy* partner in Iraq.
In the meantime, this dilemma explains the rather bland mix of reservations and tacit understanding which we see coming out of Iran on the topic of the SOFA. I have no doubt whatsoever that Tehran fully understands that Maliki and his cohorts are for sale to the highest bidder. Likewise, the Iranians also fully understand that Sadr is too inconsistent and too unreliable to bet on him. Thus, they are stuck in a very dangerous role of being always halfway here and halfway there.
This is a very dangerous place to be in for the Iranians. First, it makes them look unprincipled and cynical. I bet you that all the arguments about the lack of good allies don’t look one bit convincing to the average Iraqi. Second, but not being able to articulate a clear position, Iran risks alienating every major faction in Iraq. “Divide and conquer” can be an effective technique for the short to middle term, but for the long term it never makes you popular and the risk of blowback are very real.
Of course, Iran could try to do what the Americans do in so many countries and create a political force ex nihilo, but think about this: has this tactic every worked?! I can’t think of a single case.
Iran did not “create” Hezbollah. Hezbollah really created itself. All the Iranians did was to correctly identify it as a trustworthy partner and support it. That is, alas, not an option which Iran has in Iraq, at least for the time being.
The political realities on the ground in Iraq being what they are, I expect the chaos and bloodshed to continue for the foreseeable future.
The Saker
Peace Saker,
Interesting analysis. I am not happy one bit at the way this bargain has been done by the Iraqis but I fear they are trying to toy with the US here and agreeing to it and then once it reaches the parliament it fails. Dangerous tactic but if they can pull it off then it will be a great victory for them.
I do not think the finger can be point at the Marjiyyah [Ayatollahs] of Najaf in this. Al-Sistani from the beginning has voiced his concerns outright but if the Government is not going to consider them then it does sound like he is being sidelined. The reality on the ground is strange, there is a big sort of split amongst the Shias in a manner over this. Moqtada has rallied a cry of an outright rejection over the SOFA, he is aiming for a much shorter timetable for the troops to leave which is not going to come regardless of how much he beats the drums.
Maliki realises that his days in the office are pretty much numbered now given that the elections are coming soon and it seems that he would not be returning to the office given the current consensus of the people. His role is crucial in the SOFA and hence he was decided to take the conditions that were put forth by Al-Sistani and use them to broke some sort of deal for Iraq. He realises that US is not going to leave within the next year from Iraq hence they have accomodate them somehow without causing too much friction in the region. That is why we see the three conditions such as the permanent bases, Iraq should not be used for an attack on its neighbours and the departure of the US troops. However there was a big powercard which the US put in the SOFA which negates the three conditions in an instance, both sides can disregard the SOFA by giving 12 months notice that is a BIG clause in the deal and here the chess game begins where we see who will call it first and remove the SOFA. I have a feeling it might be the Iraqis but they will be forced to do that. US calling this would make them seem weak in the region and it could also provide the Iraqis to say no to their request but if it is from the Iraqis the US will take it with both hands.
The Iranians have been giving a mixed reaction to this. Ali Larijani did not seem too happy about this but he remained optimistic. The whole issue regarding Iran is that it wants the US forces out of there and it is banking that the first two conditions will be honoured and hence it is coming across as being pleasant with this result. I think the reality will be clearer once the dust settles. It would be interesting to note what comes out of Qum in the next week or so.
VS,
How can you say, “While Iran has plenty of power and influence in Iraq, it does not have any reliable allies” with a straight face?
I know that you are by far more knowledgeable of the facts than this. The fact that you keep being an apologist for Iran, when its duplicity is fully exposed, does not serve you well.
You very well know that the most powerful militia in Iraq is the Badr thugs, with Hakim as their leader. And who created this militia (in Iran), nurtured it, financed it, armed it, trained it, advised it, and continues to do so? None other than the Revolutionary Guards of Iran! And you have the nerve to say that Iran has no reliable allies in Iraq? Come on Saker, try another one!
@altigerrr: Most observers seem to think that if the cabinet passed this, so will the Parliament and I have on reason to think otherwise. As for al-Sistani, I would have to disagree with you in the sense that “voicing concerns” just does not cut it when Iraq is being totally destroyed by the occupation forces. As you say, time will show who will prevail in this matter.
@Tony: How can you say, “While Iran has plenty of power and influence in Iraq, it does not have any reliable allies” with a straight face?
I say this because I do not believe that Maliki is a reliable ally for Iran. The guy is utterly without any principles and he is for sale for the highest bidder which, for the time being, is the USA. The Hakim camp and the Badr forces are tremendously unpopular because of their support for the Maliki regime and, therefore, the occupation. So while Iran probably has retained a good deal of influence with Badr Corps officers who, as you correctly point out, where trained by the RG in Iran,they have no person they would trust at the top of the Hakim/Maliki/Dawa/Badr entity.
Think about it this way: having *very* tight contacts with the Iranian military did not help the USA very much once the Shah was overthrown and the same thing can be said of, say, Venezuela where the USA has super tight control of the military until Chavez came to power. It is not enough to create a force and maintain contacts within it when the top leadership of this force is playing its own little game.
As an aside, I am sad to note the consistently hostile tone of your comments. It is unfair and it does nothing to strengthen your arguments. You have let your blog become a cesspool of endless insults and personal attacks, and that is your right, but please understand that I want to maintain a certain quality of discussion here.
Thanks a lot in advance,
The Saker
Tony,
Just one quick point, Badr Brigade’s loyalty to Iran went when they merged with the Iraqi Army. They were formed and trained by the RG in Iran and used for the 8 year war against Saddam. After the invasion they came over however after the death of Baqir Al Hakim much has changed.
There is even talk of Al-Hakim now has turned on Iran and is continually speaking out against them just not publically enough. Iran has lost Hakim as a supporter by the looks of it and VS is right in saying they have none to choose from but Maliki and Moqtada and those two choices help nothing because one is using arms to establish his way and the other using the veil of legality.
VS,
The role of Sistani cannot be understood so simplistically. If you look at his involvement from 2003 then you will see why many accusing him of being silent. The fact is that even if he speaks out many would not turn to him because of their loyalty to the likes of Maliki, Moqtada and Hakim. He is a loneman. I remember how an Iraqi once said if you have a militia you can do alot in Iraq and that seems to be somewhat true.
@altigerr: let me repeat here that I might be wrong about al-Sistani. As I have clearly indicated in my piece, I do not claim to understand his motives or reasons. But I cannot but notice that he was equally silent, and in the UK, when the Americans attacked Moqtada al-Sadr the first time. He eventually came back, but that was rather late in the game, no? Aain, I am not saying that I am correct, I am only saying that the little I know about al-Sistani disturbs me. How can the spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shia remain silent during most of the occupation? How can he not use his undeniable authority?
I am, however, very intrigued by your comment that Sistan does not have a militia. While this is formally correct, does he not have a spiritual authority over all Shia militias in Iraq? Could the Hakim or Sadr groups openly oppose him?
Thanks in advance for your clarifications on this very important issue!
I the US wanted to lean on Maliki,we could have a frank meeting and say without a SOFA, we would make a separate peace with Kurdistan, move in there with massive permanent bases, lots of Israeli advisors, FOREVER. I would promise to give the Kurds more than autonomy.
anonymous: all that has already been tried to one degree or another. The thing is – the US is not the superpower it used to be. Even with the help of the Kurds and the Israelis, the US simply does not have the means, in terms of money and military power, to continue its occupation of Iraq. It’s over. What we are discussing here are just the modalities of the US withdrawal, that’s it.
I think Ayat. Sistani should not be looked at in isoloation. The marjiyya is an institution, not only about a single person. Because it is an institution, there are all kinds of interests that come into play.
The particular institution represented by Ayat. Sistani is decidedly conservative, and favors quietism not only for the sake of the quietest stream of thought, but also who “follow” this particular line. I think understanding those factors, would help in better analyzing the situation.
There is a good documentary (don’t know if it has been translated into English) – that details the background of Baqir Sadr, and his interaction with the different ideological streams of thought in Najaf.
There are times, when the kind of prudence and caution taken by the quietists were very important in preserving the Shi’a community – but there were other times, when this same has been very problematic, and a hinderance.
So, time will tell, if Ayat. Sistani has taken the correct decision — my own view is conflicted. I think it is just not possible to take on the US – yet, it is possible to have enough civil disobedience within Iraq, to cause it a major headache – that would both preserve life, yet not allow the country to become a colony. But that kind of organizing takes years and decades, Hizb. after all, did not just appear overnight — it took a great deal of work, and time for it to be at the place it is now…
@anonymous #2: thanks for that very interesting comment. I can only repeat here that I fully admit to my ignorance of the personality of al-Sistany and the Marjiyya. My *impressions* about him are only that: impressions. I cannot understand his silence, but this says probably less about him then about me, does it not?
I invite you to come back an expand on your comments how the institution of the Marjiyya is composed of different currents. Could you please give us some more details about this?
Also – could you explain “quietism”? The only form of quietism I know is a purely spiritual (Hesychasm) and it implies no form of silence in secular matters at all.
Many thanks in advance for any clarifications!
VS
Anonymous,
Your comment kinda hints on the situation but there is much more to it. The institution of Marjiyyah is somewhat divided into in their stance regarding political issues. Quietism might be the way of the Marjiyyah in Iraq to an extent but there have been many activists in it to as you mentioned the like of Baqir Al Sadr, Ayat Mohsen Al Hakeem, Baqir Al Hakeem and Sadiq al Sadr to name a few.
I think you are right in time will tell about the decision of Al Sistani, however I feel that given the situation on the ground his stance is pretty much justified. He has not met any American officials plus he has helped when the situation has required him to.
Can you tell me the name of the documentary you mentioned? Thanks
@altigerrr: peace, my friend. Can I invite you to answer the same questions I put to anonymous2 about the various currents/factions in the Marjiyya and about the role of quietism in defining al-Sistani’s political stance?
I think that we are hitting on two super important issues here and I am hungry for more information on this.
Thanks!
The Saker
Link to a Urdu translation of the Al-Manar documentary on Baqr Sadr is avail. here. The Arabic version is probably available somewhere on the net also — I don’t think this has been translated into English…
As you may know that at this time there are several individuals who are acknowledged as being a marja, and each have their “followers” with occasional inside controversies. Some of them are Ayat. Sistani, Ayat. Fadhlullah (Lebanon primarily, somewhat controversial –) Ayat. Khamenei.
However, these are not absolute “one man rule” as such, and within the offices of each, there exists a variety of tendencies. If you are familiar with the role played by Ayat. Khamenei at a state level, of attempting to balance divergent interests, a similar balance has to also be struck by the marja at their own levels.
Ayat. Sistani follows a particular line that has tended to be “quietist” – i.e. a cautious approach to politics, and mobilizing of people for social change. This is not absolute “quietist” – rather its tendencies are towards being more cautious.
And so he attracts those who prefer this approach. At the risk of over generalizing , Ayat. Sistani has tended to attract a greater percentage of more middle class Shi’as – who prefer a sense of stability, and a more conservative – less confrontational reading of the lives of the 12 Imams. But he also attracts others, with different views, who recognize his scholarship – and those are also present in his offices.
The more activist ulema, such as Ayat. Baqer Sadr, Imam Khomeini, Ayat. Khamenei (also at the level of marja) – are more inclined towards being activist, and mobilization.
The best I can put it, is that both have risks — the risk of the quietist is that, because of their caution, they may not recognize when the people are ready for change, and thus squander historical moments. The risk of the activist is that they may call on the people to rise too soon, and risk fizzling out a movement.
Both the quietist, and activist claim legitimacy based on Qur’an and hadith, and lives of the Imams (AS). Both have their respective “proofs.” And both have accused each other of the risks I mentioned above.
Imam Khomeini was severely criticized by the “quietists” – because of his revolutionary calls. But he had cultivated an ability to correctly, and repeatedly so, judge historical events. And became an example for the position of the Vilayate Faqih (sp.? ) whose responsibility includes evaluating and make decisions with an overall and macro view, based on Islamic religious values, of-course.
It needs to be said that the VF – is not only based on someone who knows politics, but rather, someone who has done the “inner” spiritual work so that, as much as possible, they can set aside their own ego. This “irfani” tendency of the line that Imam Khomeini took also caused controversy both during his own time, and subsequently (but less so now than before – and again no absolutes here – more of a question of the degree to which this was emphasized).
@anonymous3: thanks for these explanations. I have two follow up questions:
a) am I correct in saying that Ayatollah al-Sistani does not accept the concept of Vilayat-e Faqih (and neither does Sheikh Fadlallah, is I am not mistaken); thus, an in other words, how (in)dependent is al-Sistani on the position of the Iranians?
b) if I am not mistaken, Hassan Nasrallah is granted the title of Hojatoleslam or “proof of Islam”, but that does not give him sufficient authority to take a position distinct from his own spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Specifically, am I correct in guessing that Hassan Nasrallah simply cannot do anything other than to support the position of Ali Khamenei on the issue of the SOFA?
I apologize in advance for the primitive nature of these questions and for my ignorance of Shia Islam.
Many thanks in advance!
VS
Ayat Sistani and Ayat. Fadhlullah – both do accept the concept of VF, but not necessarily in its present form… meaning that both recognize the importance of the role of the highest Islamic scholar to guide society – but differ on the extent of that authority. And whether the authority of Ayat. Khamenei extends outside of Iran.
As such, Ayat. Sistani acts independently of Iran -he would have to, of-course, take into consideration geo-political issues (but not base his views on Iran’s authority).
Hasan Nasrullah is at the level of H.I. , and would thus follow the rulings of Ayat. Khamenei. However, I doubt that Ayat. Khamenei is going to give a specific public position on SOFA.
This will allow for people such as Hasan Nasrullah to be critical of the SOFA – and at the same time for Iran to not appear completely antagonistic towards Iraq, or be accused of “interfering” by the puppet regime of Maliki.
@anonymous4: thanks a *lot* for your very interesting answers, really! I am extremely interested by these topics which most commentators seem to steer away from,for whatever reason.
Can I ask you for a small favor?
Please stay around and continue to share your insights we us, and please continue to do so anonymously, but I would prefer if you chose some kind of pseudonym and just signed your posts. No need to open an account anywhere, I allow anonymous posts on the blog (heck, I *encourage* them!), but just for the clarity of “who is who” it would be easier for me to have some handle, some pseudo/alias so as to not confuse the various anonymous posters here.
If you have never contacted me directly in the past (I have many readers which post anonymously here, but with whom I exchange emails privately), please drop me an email at vineyardsaker@gmail.com. I would like to have the option to contact you if I have a question about the topics we discussed today.
Many thanks in advance,
VS
This has been a very informative conversation. As a Shia I am aware of there being a more quietest viewpoint of Shia Islam versus a more revolutionary viewpoint. I think that this has also been referred to in some circles as the Red Shia and the Black Shia ideologies.
I would like to have some feedback here as to the validity of the following opinion piece:
Tehran Times Opinion Column, March 13, By Hamid Golpira
Red Shia Crescent rising
http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=460461
@everybody:
I have to agree with Mar: this conversation has, indeed, been very informative and I want to sincerely thank you all for making it such! This is what I always wanted my blog to be: a place for intelligent discussion of controversial but important topics in which many more voices than mine are heard. We are gradually making this happen, step by step, and I really thank you all for this!
I also would like to hear reactions to the “Black Shia vs. Red Shia” idea and the conclusions of the author of the Mehr article.
Many thanks to you all!
The Saker
Peace,
Ok let me start with what I had intended to post and then I will come to the comments.
The institution of Marjiyyah like any other institution has evolved over the years with many different ideologies taking shape. Najaf was the main centre of the Marjiyyah for a very long period and produced many of the great Shia Marjas. Iran had many of their own too but the importance always remained with Najaf as it was seen as the centre of Shia Theology at the time. The shift came later on after the Revolution and the centre of Shia Theology became Qum, there were many factors involved in this and one of them was the atrocities that were done on the Najaf Hawza by Saddam and his forces. He went as far as expelling many of the Shia Scholars from Iraq so alot of them moved to Iran and settled there.
The Revolution in Iran marked a new chapter in the institution of the marjiyyah bringing the activism era as to speak with the likes of Imam Khomeini, Ayat Baqir Sadr, Ayat Khamenai and many others till the present. However this is where we find factions within the Marjiyyah and each of the marjas who follow a certain ideology have their followers as to speak as mentioned by ‘Anonymous’. Alot of these factions are regarding the belief in the authority the Marja has. The issue of Wilayatul Faqee is the certain point in these factions to an extent. Ayat Khamenai is a believer of Wilayatul Faqee as established and implemented by Imam Khomeini. While Ayat Sistani and Sayed Fadullah believe in the lesser authority in regards to Wilayatul Faqee.
Both sides are as important as other in my opinion because the current situation in Iraq has shown that. While I was in Iran there were many statements flying about regarding how Ayat Khamenai and Ayat Sistani communicate with eachother for the Iraqi affairs which in itself indicates that regardless of the beliefs they share they are willing to work together for the Shias. This is something which all the Marjas put forward as the point of importance, the protection or the well being of the Shias over the world.
VS, in regards to your question it has come across that the position of Ayat Sistani is that as his predeccessor Ayat Khoei in regards to the issue of Wilayatul Faqee. Every Marja accepts the concept of Wilayatul Faqee but differs on the authority that is undertaken. Ayat Khoei did not believe that a Marja can hold full authority as Imam Khomeini did.
Sayed Hasan Nasrullah is not at the level of a Jurist as to speak yet from what I know. He is regarded as one of the greatest Scholars from his generation. He follows Ayat Khamenai in all aspects. And I agree with the comments of ‘Anonymous’ that Ayat Khamenai will not give a public position regarding SOFA well not so soon anyways maybe in a few months down the line we can see.
Coming to the article link posted, I am very critical of this Black Shia Vs Red Shia comparison. I find that it paints alot of people with the same brush and also justifies many attacks from one side to the other and vice versa. While it may seem as that this is the era of the Activists in the Institute of Marjiyyah yet one cannot disregard the other end of the spectrum quite easily as they are quite vital too. A perfect example is the situation in Iraq, Ayat Sistani is seen as quietist but he has been involved in shaping the future of Iraq to an extent since the fall of Saddam.
Ayatollah Sistani (may Allah prolong his life) as a ‘national’ figure, and not simply as a Shia jurist, or a Shia jurist who lends weight to the political dynamics of the Shia community. Iraqi society has been fragmented by political leaders who lack vision and the wisdom to rise above petty politics; it has been debilitated by the lack of a regional will to support and acknowledge the new political landscape of Iraq (due to several factors); and more importantly, there exists on the ground a brutal military occupation that could not have heralded any semblance of real democracy or “bright future”, because it NEVER was within the aim of this imperialistic venture.
Purely looking at Iraq as a Shia, the reach of the Marjiiyyah has been very limited not only over the last 30 or so years, but there has been a historical void between the masses and their leadership which perhaps returns to the 20s [as a matter of fact, there has never been as strong attachment between the masses and the Marjiiyyah in Iraq as seen in Iran for historical reasons]. As such, a lot of ground needs to be covered if a constitutional religious democracy is envisaged for Iraq.
I would argue that the approach adopted by Ayat Sistani is more in like with the stance of the constitutional movement in the early 1900s in Iran led by scholars like Ayatollah Modaress. Following the experience of what happened in Iran where the role of Islam in the constitution was later undermined, a personality like Ayat Sistani knows too well that having something written in black and white is not good enough.
The dominant paradigm suggests that since the overthrow of Saddam, Ayat Sistani has finally got the chance to rebuild Najaf to its former heights and rise as an equal to Qum.
@altigerrr: many, many, many thanks for your most interesting and informative comments! This type of insights is absolutely *priceless*, at least for me. I am very grateful for your efforts to explain all this!
VS
altigerrrr,
Assalaamun Alaikum.
I can see why you are critical of the article I posted, as it does divide the Shias into two conflicting groups. And I am sure that most Shia, like myself, fall somewhere in the middle of these two oppositely defined groups.
As for myself, although Sayed Sistani is my Marja based on the belief that he is the most knowledgeable, I feel much empathy with the examples of Iran and Hezbollah in standing up to and resisting the Western/Zionist agenda for the Middle East region.
And I have been somewhat perplexed by Sayed Sistani’s quietism in his dealing with the situation of Iraq under occupation.
Could I ask you what you think of Dr. Ali Shariati’s “Red Shi’ism (the religion of martyrdom) vs. Black Shi’ism (the religion of mourning)” which was written before the Iranian revolution and I assume may have been written as a motivating piece to encourage the Iranian revolution against the Shah?
http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/red_black_shiism.php
And would you agree with how Sayed Fadlallah described the situation of the Shia in an interview posted on Bayynat?:
http://english.bayynat.org.lb/news/mustakbal22042003.htm
I ran across this and thought to share it:
Unofficial Translation of U.S.-Iraq Troop Agreement from the Arabic Text
By McClatchy Newspapers | November 19, 2008
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article21272.htm
Mar,
Wsalaams,
Like you I follow Ayat Sistani as a source of emulation [taqleed] but I am very supportive of Hizbullah and Iran and moreover, I am actually a strong supporter of the Wilayatul Faqee concept and I support Ayat Khamenai too.
I do not agree with painting the Shias in those two defined groups for a few reasons. I know that this sort of division comes from the article written by Ali Shariati in his works. While I agree greatly with some of his works I am actually very critical when people use these works to cause divisions. A lot of Shias that I know who are critical of Ayatollah Sistani use this piece as their basis to justify their attacks.
His article highlights alot of truth but at the same time I feel many of the Shias are isolated to know how the Marjiyyah works or what it thinks. I have met some Marjas in my life time and I have always been touched by their words they speak as they are aware of what happens in the world. They might not directly talk about a subject but their words are not far from from the direct issue concerning the Muslims.
I think personally there is a lot of grey area which we are not aware of regarding the Marjiyyah. A lot of things which we wish to know are not transparent and alot of our conclusions come from that. I remember how I use to think of the Marjiyyah about 5 years ago until I met one of the Marjas on a visit to Iran.
I will comment on the other article you linked tomorrow. Its late here and I have an early start tomorrow. I did read most of it and yea it does mention some great points but there is certain things which I do not agree like how he establishes that Arabs are opposed etc.
(formerly known as anonymous, will use this alias from here on)
I think the concept of Red-Black Shi’a while somewhat useful to help understand the various “types” of Shi’as — is a bit simplistic, given that aspects of each can also be found in both… However, I think Shariati was more interested in discussing the attempted co-optation of Shi’a Islam, and this is not only about Shi’as, but also very much so with Sunnis, and indeed with all religions, and social movements. And so Dr. Shariati’s essay can be useful in that regard… I also agree with some of the other comments…
I think though, that the “mourning” observance during the month of Muharram, in itself, carries such a profound questioning of history, and raises the issue of false authority so clearly, that it would be difficult to completely co-opt Shi’as for very long… Which is why those observance were from time to time banned – and were carried on “underground.”
The SOFA issue is going to get interesting. I was reading that Ayat. Sistani has asked that there be an agreement in Parliment (rather than just a majority vote?) And that this agreement be reached with all major political forces?
If this is really the case, then I don’t see how the vote is going to meet that requirement… Already one major political force is dead set against it – Sadr, and so are other significant minority groupings…
That means only three groups support it — and while those three are a majority (in the legislature) if they do try to ram this through, it is going to seriously divide Iraq (even more so than it is now).
I hope that if an agreement is not reached, then they won’t try to force this through — and avoid creating even more divisions.
@edgewise: thanks for picking an alias and welcome to my blog! Many, many thanks for your comments and explanations. Posters like you, altigerrr and others add so much to this blog that I cannot thank you all enough.
@everybody:
I read yesterday that the spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry has stated that Iran will only state its position about the SOFA once the Iraqi takes a final vote on it.
Does this make sense to anyone here?!
What I think is important to keep in mind about Sayed Sistani is that although he said “the approval or disapproval of a US-Iraqi security pact is a matter for the Parliament” he also stressed “the importance of a sovereign Iraq and said that the deal should be approved only if it restores Iraq’s sovereignty”.
I suspect that Sayed Sistani is trying to send a quiet message to the Parliament …
Is Iraq sovereign under occupation? Will the approval of this particular agreement end the occupation and render Iraq sovereign?
I suggest watching the 19 Nov. 2008 Fine Print “Iraq-US Deal” program:
http://www.presstv.ir/Programs/player/?id=76043
“That kind of image is *priceless* in hammering into the minds of the (mostly militaristic) American people”
I wouldn’t say most Americans are militaristic. I’d say most Americans wish very much that we had nothing to do with Iraq and that we were on good terms with Iran. The vast majority of Americans now think very very little of Bush and can only hope Obama will be an improvement.
btw, if the US attacks Iran without provocation, there will be hell to pay no matter how much support Obama has now.
very interesting blog, good job.